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IN

~The Supreme
Court
OF THE
State of Utah
LAURA MORRIS, Special Admin~tratrix of the Estate of Washing'ton Pocatello and Minnie Pocatello,
~Pis Wife~ Both Deceased, and LUCY
~J!OCATELLO JOHNSON, MAUDE
POCATELLO RACEHORSE,
.ltisBPHINE POCATELLO, and
·a;)\ Y POCATELLO, Heirs of
W~n Pocatello and Minnie
Pocatello, Deceased,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
··AMASA L. CLARK, J 0 S E PH
E. ROBINSON and BOX ELDER
¢OUNTY,
Defendants and Respondents.
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No.6248

<PETITION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING

P. C. O'MALLEY,
Attorney for Appellants,
Residence: Pocatello, Idaho.
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IN

The Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
LAURA MORRIS, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Washington Pocatello and Minnie Pocatello,
His Wife, Both Deceased, and LUCY
POCATELLO JOHNSON, MAUDE
RACEHORSE,
P 0 CA TELL 0
JOSEPHINE POCATELLO, and
R A Y P 0 C A T E L L 0, Heirs of
Washington Pocatello and Minnie
Pocatello, Deceased,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
AMASA L. CLARK, J 0 S E P H
E. ROBINSON and BOX ELDER
COUNTY,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING
Appellants respectfully petition the court
that it grant a rehearing of the above case for the
following reasons, to wit; that the decision of this
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court in said cause is erroneous, for the reasons
hereinafter pointed out.
That in respectfully asking for this rehearing,
Appellants assure the court that it is not made
for the purpose of any delay or procrastination to
prevent the filing in the Lower Court, of this
Court's remittitur in ~he Cause; that Appellants
are Indian wards of the United States Government, and intend if possible to appeal from said
decision to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and this petition for rehearing is made
with humble and true sincerity, for the purpose
of exhausting every effort for redress in the State
Court of Utah, prior to trying to perfect appellants' appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States. And respectfully assert that this Court
has erred in its decision filed on April 18th, 1941
for the following reasons;
First: The Appellants quote five paragraphs
of the court's opinion which is as follows:
Plaintiffs' intestates were Shoshone Indians residing on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation in Idaho. The tract of land in question
was not allotted land but was acquired by the
ancestor of Washington Pocatello, one Yaotes
Owa, through homesteading of the land and
the issuance of patent from the United States.
Yaotes Owa died in Box Elder County, Utah,
in the late eighties. Probate proceedings on
her estate were not commenced until 1917.
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5
By a decree of distribution made therein, November 7, 1919, a one-third interest in the 80
acre tract in questi9-P was decreed to Washington Pocatello. However, about February
2, 1917-more than two years prior to the
date of said decree-the said Washington
Pocatello and his wife, Minnie, entered into a
contract to sell the eighty acre tract to one
U. F. Diteman, predecessor in interest of respondents herein, for a consideration of
$3200.00, payable $200.00 in cash with annual
installments of $300.00 payable in December
of each year, the last installment becoming
due, therefore, in December 1926. A warranty
deed reciting a consideration of $3200.00 was
executed by Washington and his wife Minnie,
as sole heirs of Y aotes Ow a, to the 80 acre
tract, and said deed was deposited with the
First National Bank of Pocatello, Idaho, as
escrow depositary to be held by it until the
full purchase price was paid, and thereupon
to be delivered to the grantee therein named.
An affidavit setting forth the terms of the
agreement was executed by the cashier of the
bank and filed of record in the office of the
County Recorder of Box Elder County. Washington Pocatello died April 27, 1917-less
tha:1 three months after executing said deed
--z.nc! Iv1innic, his v:Hc, died 11ay 28, 1928.
"On January 12, 1920, one Charles E. Foxley was appointed administrator of the Estate
of 'Vashington Pocatello. The deed placed in
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escrow, as hereinabove recited, was on November 10, 1919 filed of record with the County Recorder of Box Elder County, having been
theretofore delivered by the escrow holder to
an agent of the grantee therein named.
"At the time of the trial, the First National
Bank of Pocatello, Idaho, had been liquidated.
Foxley, the administrator of the Estate of
Washington Pocatello had long since left the
jurisdiction of the court. However, it appears
from the pleadings that some time after his
appointment as administrator and after the
date when the deed was recorded, Foxley reported to the probate court that he had received $995.00-property of the estate-from
the First National Bank of Pocatello, Idaho.
This report was never passed upon by the
court.
"By their pleadings, in addition to setting
forth the facts hereinabove recited, plaintiffs
alleged that the deed placed in escrow was delivered by the depositary upon payment of
only $1,000 of the consideration recited therein and agreed to 'be paid, that defendants had
full knowledge of such facts when they purchased the premises and hence were not bona
fide purchasers thereof. Upon these issues the
trial court found in favor of defendants and,,-- .. ~... :;,.-,~-:-::_,·,:
against plaintiffs. On the issue of payment
vel non of the full consideration to the deposi-
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tary before the delivery by it of the deed, the
court made the following finding:
" ... that the depositary bank had no right
to deliver the Deed to said property without
a full compliance with the terms and obligations of the Escrow Agreement but the Court
finds that the Deed was regular on its face,
recited the consideration of $3200.00 and from
the evidence in the case the Court finds that
said $3200.00 recited in the Deed was paid to
said Escro·w Holder p.nd that the transaction
with said Bank was not fraudulent ... "
Appellants again humbly and respectfully
assert that the trial court erred in its findings, and,
that this Court has erred in sustaining and affirming the finding of the trial court, for the reason
that by making such finding the trial court, and,
this Court by sustaining and affirming such finding has throvvn the burden upon the appellants
to prove by a preponderence of evidence that a
deed placed in escrow not to be delivered until the performance of the condition expressed in
said escrow, was fully performed and complied
with before the delivery of the deed, in other
words that Appellants must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that the deed was wrongfully delivered, vvhich finding is contrary to the
great weight of authority, to, the effect, that when
it is shown that the deed was placed in escrow not
to be delivered until the full performance of the
condition expressed in the escrow agreement, the
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budren is upon the person claiming title by virtue
of that deed to prove by a preponderence of the
evidence, that the conditions of the escrow agreement was fully performed and complied with before the deed was delivered, and that unless the
person claiming under said deed does prove that it
was validly delivered, the deed is void and of no
force and effect and passes no title to the property.
And, more particularly in this case where the defendants by their answer and supplemental answer, pleaded the deed as their title, and asked
affirmative relief, for the court to quiet title in
them for the said undivided one-third interest involved.
Appellants have cited such a long array of
weighty authority on this question in their former
briefs, that it appears useless to quote further authority, but so as the Court will have some of the
authorities before it we again cite the following:
C. J. Vol. 21, 894, 895.

Kavanaugh vs Kavanaugh, 260 Ill. 179, 103
N. E. 65.
Black vs Shreve, 13 N. J. Equity, 455.
Balfour vs Hopkins, 93 Fed. 564.
This is an action to quiet title, and involves a
property right and for an accounting of the rents
and profits, and title to property, and is an action
in equity. The defendants by answer and suppleSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mental answer denied the plaintiffs title pleaded
this deed as giving them title, and asked for affirmative relief and the lower court granted defendants
affirmative relief. That placed upon the respondents the burden of proving valid delivery of the
deed. Appellants go no further for authority for
this rule of law, than the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah:
Corpus Juris, lays down the rule of law as
follows:
''\Vhere defendant pleads an affirmative defense, and sets up in his answer facts in avoidance, the burden of proof is upon him. So, too,
the burde:1 of proving allegations in a cross
bill necessary to entitle defendant to affirmative relief rests upon him to the same extent
as if he had brought an original action to obtain the same relief."
C. J. Vol 22, Sec. 17, Page 74.
The only Supreme Court case that the authors
of Corpus Juris cites in support of that rule is a
case from the Supreme Court of the State of Utah,
wherein the Court held as follows:
"The burden of making such proof was on the
defendants for the additional reason that the
decree dismissed plaintiffs complaint, and
awarded to the defendants the relief sought
by them in the cross complaint. The burden
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of proving the allegations of the cross complaint, necessary to entitle the defendant to
the decree rendered, rests upon them in the
same manner and to the same extent that it
would have done had they instituted an original action to qbtain the relief prayed for in
the cross complaint."
Herriman Irr. Co. vs. Butterfield Min. etc Co.,
19 Utah 453. 57 Pac. 537, 51 L. R. A. 930.
This decision of the Supreme Court of Utah,
is considered such sound law, that it is quoted in
Corpus Juris, and reported in L.R.A.
It is admitted in the pleadings, and found by
the lower court, and also found by this court that
the plaintiffs and appellants, the heirs of Washington Pocatello, are the only living heirs of Yatoes Ow a the original patentee of the said 80 acres.
And that they are Indians, wards of the Government, living on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation
in Idaho. Despite this finding, the lower court, and
this Court, have overlooked the United States Statute cited by the appellants in their briefs namely
that in trials or right of property between Indians
and white men, that once it is shown that the Indian had previous ownership or possession the
burden is upon the white man. And appellants
again quote that statute.

Trial of Right of Property; burden of proof:
"In all trials about the right of property in
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'''hich an Indian may be a party on one side,
and a \Vhite person on the other, the burden
of proof rests upon the white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption
of title in himself from the fact of previous
possession or ownership." Act of Congress,
June 30, 1834, C161, Sec. 22, 4 Stat, 763, R. S.
Sec. 2125 U. S. Code Compact Edition Sec.
194.
Appellants contend that is the law of the land
today, and applies in this case, because not only
are the appellants Ip.dians, but their ancestors
through whom respondents claim title were all
Indians.
This double burden of proof, was not only on
the respondents in the lower court but it followed
them to this court, and for that reason respondents
had no standing in law or equity to move to strike
appellants bill of exceptions, as the burden is upon
them to bring before the appellate court the entire record to show to the appellate court that the
trial court had sufficient evidence before it to
grant the respondents the affirmative relief they
prayed for, and, that the trial court granted.
Second:
Appellants very respectfully assert;
that this being an action to quiet title, and the
respondents having answered, setting up affirmative relief in the form of an affirmative answer
which is the same as a cross complaint, and praying for affirmative relief that title be quieted
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in them, and the lower court having decreed affirmative relief to respondents, and dismissed appellants action, and the lower court having within
its discretion permitted appellants to file their Bill
of Exception, so as to bring the entire record before this court; that this court erred, in striking
appellants bill of exception on the motion of respondents; that by so striking said bill of exception on the motion of respondents; that this
Court relieved the respondent of the burden
that the Supreme Court of the State of Utah,
by its former decision in the case of Herri-man Irr. Co., vs. Butterfield Min. etc. Co., reported in 19 Ut, at page 453 and other decisions, has placed on respondents, without overruling the law laid down in the former decision.
Third: Further, the appellants respectfully assert that this Court erred in striking appellants bill
of exceptions, for the reason that this is a suit in
equity, and it is the duty of this court to pass upon
both the question of law and fact. The appeal in
this case was taken upon both questions of law
and fact, and from the whole thereof, see, page
157, Abstract of Record. Appellants believe it is
not necessary to quote or call to this court's attention the provisions of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, or the law enacted by the Legislature of Utah pertaining to the provisions of the
. Constitution relative to that point, we will rest
this point on the recent decision of this court, filed
January 3rd, 1939, wherein Justice Moffat held:
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"This being an equity case we are required
to examine the evidence and determine the
facts for ourselves. It has sometimes been
stated that the review of an equity case under
our Constitution and laws is a trial de novo
upon the record. In equity cases the review
in this court in effect is a trial de novo on the
record," Jensen vs Howell, 75 Utah, 64, 282
Pac, 1034, 1038. "In equity cases, this court
is authorized to review both questions of law
and of fact," Independent Oil & Gas Co. vs
Shelton et al., 79 Utah, 384, 6 Pac. 2d, 1027,
1032."
Federal Land Bank of Berkley vs Salt Lake
Valley Sand and Gravel Co., et al ........... .
Utah, 85 Pac. 2d, 791.
In the case of Jensen vs Howell, the Court
said:
"This case is one in equity. In this jurisdiction the binding effect of findings of the trial
court in law cases is different from equity
cases. In the former, the findings as a general
rule, are approved if there is sufficient competent evidence to support them, and, primarily are not disturbed, unless it is manifest that they are so clearly against the weight
of the evidence as to indicate a misconception,
or not a due consideration of it. In the latter,
our duty and responsibility in approving or
disapproving findings vvhen challenged are
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more comprehensive. In such cases on an appeal and a review on questions of both law
and fact, and on a challenge of the findings,
the review in effect is a trial de novo on the
record. On such a review, if, after making due
allowance as to the better opportunity of the
trial court to observe the demeanor of witnesses, or determining their credibility and
the weight of their testimony, we on the record nevertheless are persuaded that a challenged finding is against the fair preponderence or greater weight of the evidence, or not
supported by it, vve disapprove it, and make
or direct a finding or remand the case for further proceedings: otherwise we affirm it."
Jensen vs Howell, Supra, 75 Utah, 64.
Therefore appellants respectfully assert that
this court erred in striking the Bill of Exceptions
on respondents motion. And affirming the decision
of the lower court, quieting title in that undivided
one-third interest in respondents. This Court in its
opinion in this. case does not even say that it is an
action in equity.
Fourth: Deed placed in escrow, alleged
wrongfully delivered; relation back to time of delivery.
Appellants respectfully assert that both the
trial court and this court has mistakenly applied
the doctrine of relation back to the time of execution of this deed in this case.
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The trial court held, and this court quoted the
holding of the trial court as follows:
" ..... that the depositary bank had no right
to deliver the Deed to said property without
a full compliance ·with the terms and obligations of the Escrow Agreement but the Court
finds that the Deed was regular on its face,
recited the consideration of $3200.00 and
from the evidence in the case the Court finds
that said $3200.00 recited in the Deed was
paid to said Escrow Holder and the transaction was not fraudulent."
That holding of the trial court is the essence
of the vvhole Finding of Fact, and the decree of the
trial court, wherein the said Court granted affirmative relief to the respondent at their request, and
quieted title in respondent against the appellant
for a valuable property right, and this Court declines to determine from the evidence and the record in this case what evidence, if any, was submitted to the trial court, that gave the trial court the
right to make such a finding, because, the respondent, in order to relieve themselves of the
burden placed upon them by law and the decisions
of this court moved this court to dismiss the Bill
of Exceptions, that contained the full record of
the trial court. If the ruling of this Court( in the
three cases cited supra, is correct, wherein this
Court held that in cases of equity, the hearing in
the Supreme Court must be, de novo, and that the
Court is required to c~:8n1ine the record and pass
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on both questions of fact and law, then how can
the Court strike the Bill of Exceptions that the
trial court in its discretion settled in order to place
the full record before this Court.
The doctrine quoted by this Court in support
of its ruling on the relation back of this deed, is
based upon the one paramount provision, "When
the condition upon which the instrument is to take
effect is performed." There is no room for argument, and requires citing of but few authorities
necessary, in support of that cardinal fundamental
principal of law, that it is only "when the condition upon which the instrument is to take effect,
has been fully complied with," in an escrow agreeme:1t, and, then only in the cause of justice, will
the delivery of the deed in fiction related back to
the time of its execution.
And the duty was and is upon this Court before it can affirm that finding of the trial court, to
examine the complete record. Then can this Court
avoid that duty by striking the Bill of Exceptions
on the motion of the Respondents.
Appellants know of no better authority, that it
is only when all the conditions are fully performed, and that justice requires the doctrine of relation back be enforced, then the former opinion
written by this Court in the case of Charles E. Foxley vs J. Y. Rich, a case involving the same Charles E. Foxley mentioned in this case, and from
Box Elder County, Utah, wherein the Court said:
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''There may be circumstances under which
the deed placed in Escrow, when all the conditions are performed, will relate back to the
time of its execution but this is the case only
when justice requires that the doctrine of relation back be enforced. The title, therefore,
remained in J. Y. Rich until respondent had
complied with the conditions imposed upon
him, namely until he made the final payment
and paid the taxes assessed against the property.''
Charles E. Foxley vs J. Y. Rich, 35 Utah, 162.
The appellants beg the patience of this court
to again quote a later opinion of this court, quoted
in appellants former brief, wherein the court said:
"The controlling question is, does the evidence disclosed by the record sustain the
trial Court?
(1) This is an action in equity in which it
becomes our duty to determine questions of
fact as well as questions of law.

(2) The lease of the property in question being admittedly in the plaintiff, the burden
was upon the defendant to establish his equitable rights, if any, by the preponderence of
the evidence."
Hargraves vs. Burton, 59 Ut. 575.
In the case at Bar, it is admitted that the deed
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was placed in escr9w not to be delivered until the
full sum of $3000 was paid to the escrow depositary. It is admitted even by this court that Washington Pocatello, was dead, long before the property was decreed, that the court decreed an undivided one-third interest to his estate, that long
after his death and after the property was decreed,
that the grantee in the escrow or his agent obtained that deed and filed it of record. The burden is
upon any one claiming under that deed to prove
to this Court, that every condition of that escrow
agreement was fully complied with.
At this point appellant wishes to cite a few
more very recent authorities, that holds that a
deed placed in escrow, and obtained by the grantee
and filed of record, without the full compliance
with every condition specified in the escrow agreement passes J10 title, and is not good even in
the hands of an innocent purchaser. We call the
court's attention to a recent case of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, which contains a very exhaustive analysis of the law, namely:
Home Stake Royalty Corporation et al vs.
McLish 103 Pac 2d, 72, (decided May 28,
1940.)
Tucker et al vs. Kanatzer et al, 25 N. E. 2d,
p. 823. (Ill.)
Rothney vs Rothney, 107 Pac 2d, 294 (Cal.)
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Noakes vs. Noakes, 287 N. W. 445 (Mich.>.
This Court quotes Thompson on Real Property
Permanent Edition this authority we have not access to, but, we have access to Thompson on Real
Property, six voluf!lnS, and under the title Burden
of proving valid delivery; says:
"The burden of proving the delivery of a
deed rests upon the party who claims it was
delivered."
Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 3866, Vol.
4 P. 942. On the doctrine of relation back this authority says:
"A relation back to the first delivery is allowed only in cases of necessity, to avoid the
effect of events happening between the first
and second delivery which would otherwise
prevent the operation of the deed as intended."
Thompson Real Property, Sec. 3961, Vol. 4, P.
1044.
,_-:~~~.:
., ·.~t\~·: "

... ·
Fifth: .-AP{l~}lants respectfully assert that
this Court erred~h_vttb·e. third last paragraph of its
opinion wherein t e Court said:
"Argument is made in favor of appellants
title, to the effect that by the decree of determination .of heirship and of distribution in
the estate. of Yaotes Owa there was distributed
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to the estate of Washington Pocatello a onethird interest therein, and that such decree
establishes title of the heirs. Further, that
title to such interest having vested in the
heirs of Washington Pocatello upon the latter's death, it could thereafter be divested only by the act of the heirs themselves or by decree of a competent court. But all this disregards the escrow deed executed by the heirs'
intestates and the finding that the agreed purchase price was paid to the escro\v holder at
the time of delivery of the deed. Under such
finding by virtue of the doctrine of relation
back of title to the time of delivery of the
deed (which ·we consider applicable under
the facts as found by the trial court), in effect,
no interest vested in the heirs or in his estate."
Appellants respectfully assert, that the trial
court, and no\N, this Court has mistakenly injected
the doctrine of relation back, which is not a rule
or principle of law, but a mere fiction in law.
The doctrine of "relation back from the date
a deed is delivered to the date of its execution is a
mere fiction in law," and only invoked by courts
of competent jurisdiction, when it is proven and
shown by a preponderence of the evidence, supplied by the party claiming under the deed, that
he is in equity with clean hands, that he has performed every condition that was imposed upon
him to perform, and that it is in the furtherance
of justice that the fiction of relation back be enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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forced by the court. Individuals can not invoke the
doctrine of relation back to rob the heirs of an
estate of their just property.
The trial court and this Court has found and
held that Washington Pocatello, died April 27th,
1917. We need go no further than the laws of
Utah, and the decisions of this court to assert that
on that date, whatever interest Washington Pocatello, had in that 80 acres of land and all property
immediately on his death vested in his heirs: This
Court has held in a decision handed down less than
one year ago, namely on the 13th day of September, 1940, that immediately upon the death of a
person his estate, both real and personal, immediately vests in his heirs, the court quoting from decisions of Oklahoma, after carefully stating that
the statutes of Oklahoma were indentical with the
Laws of Utah, Section 101-4-2. R. S. of Utah, quoted the law as follovvs:
"The property, both real and personal of
one vv-ho dies without disposing of it by will,
passes to the~heirs of the intestate, subject to
the control of the county court, and to the
possession of an administrator appointed for
the purpose of administration."
Again on the same page the Court quoted:
"Upon a person dying intestate, the heirs
of such person become immediately vested
with the estate, and the estate is indefeasible,
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subject to the control of the county court and
the possession of and management by the administrator, and it is his duty simply to preserve the estate until distribution to the heirs,
unless, and in the manner provided by statute,
the necessity should arise for sale."
Again this court on the same page said by
quotation:

-

" ..... all property, both real and personal, of
.
all persons "'rho die intestate passes to the
heirs of such intestate, subject to the control
of the county court and subject to administration."
In re Harris' Estate. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust
Co. vs. Harris. Utah (Sept. 13, 1940) 105
Pac 2d, 461.
The interest of Washington Pocatello, in the
said 80 acres of land, became vested in his heirs on
the 27th day of April, 1917, and they had intermediate rights, that co~ld and can only be, taken
from them through their own acts, orthe decree
or judgment of a competent court:
Thompson on Real Property, treats of this
subject under the title Validity of Intermediate
Rights as Against Second Delivery:
·
"Intermediates rights are valid as against
second delivery. The doctrine of relation, being but a fiction in law, can not be applied to
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the prejudice of the intervening rights of third
parties."
Thompson Real Property, Vol. 4, Section
3962, P. 1045.
Appellants respectfully assert, that the trial
court had no right to invoke the fiction of the doctrine of relation back, in violation of Section 10211-26 Revised Statutes of Utah, and hold that a
deed placed in escrow and delivered 19 months
after the death of the grantor was valid and related back to the date of the execution, unless the
court was furnished clear and convincing proof by
the respondents, that the full amount of the sum
mentioned in the escrow agreement was paid before the deed was delivered, and that it was in the
furtherance of justice that the fiction in law of
relation back be involved
That Appellants further respectfully assert
that this Court has no right to affirm that finding
of the trial court invoking that fiction in law, unless this Court has examined the record, and evidence that the burden was on respondent to produce, in order to avoid procedure under Section
102-11-26 Revised Statutes of the State of Utah,
that the Legislators of the State of Utah enacted
for the protection of estates of deceased persons.
Therefore Appellants respectfully petition
this Court to grant a rehearing in the above entitled matter, and restore the Bill of Exceptions,
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and carefully consider the full record in the case,
before permitting its present decision to become
final.
Respectfully
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P. C. O'MALLEY,
\
Attorney for Appellants, I
Residence: Pocatello, Idaho.
GEORGE M. MASON,
Attorney for Appellants,
Residence: Brigham City, Utah.
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